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Abstract:
Studies of the nature of financial accounting data, as
private or public good, cannot provide the necessary guidance
for social policy choice among alternative accounting standards
and institutions. However, studies of sanctioned human
behavior relations, as private or common property rights, will
provide insights for understanding the conflicting interests
among corporate managers, investors, auditors and government
regulators. This article surveys recent literature in law
and economics dealing with property rights , and analyzes finan-
cial accounting data as a scarce economic good subject to
alternative property rights assignments. Voluntary disclosure
of data is seen as a private property right; mandatory disclosure
is seen as state or common property right. From this perspective
several propositions are deduced concerning accounting data
users, valuation, measurement, changes in accounting standards,
welfare and efficiency. The article concludes with hypotheses
about effects of any institution having power to mandate
accounting disclosure.
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"The great and chief end of teen's uniting
into commonwealths and putting themselves
under government is the preservation of
their property."
-John Locke (1690)
In the development of accounting thought, a study of alternative
property rights configurations will provide insight for dealing with many
obvious problems such as defining a fimf's resources set and specifying
the domain of accounting events. But neither of these is the main sub-
ject of this paper. The purpose of this paper is to raise the subject
of property rights in financial accounting data (second section), in the
context of Pareto-optimality (third section), and to derive some proposi-
tions relevant to the choice among accounting institution alternatives
(fourth section) * The introductory overview (first section) is minimal
because of space limitation. Readers who wish to study the field will
find the collection of articles edited by Furubotn and Pejovlch (1974)
and by Mamie (1975) most helpful. Work in history by Ncyes (1936) and
Schlatter (1951) are valuable for perspective.
Property rights literature as a recent development in law and eco-
nomics originated with Ronald Coase's classic article, "The Problem of
Social Cost" (1960). To my knowledge institutional structure consider-
ations, with financial accounting data viewed 88 an economic good, have
not been systematically presented in accounting journals. "Indeed, in
so far as the accounting literature is concerned, all that is typically
available on alternative institutional arrangements Is a somewhat emo-
tional objection to governmental influence on accounting," [Gonedes,
Dopuch and Penman, 1976, p. 100J This neglect has coincided in recent
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decades with an (ever?) emphasis on accounting data for management deci-
sion and control, where "information" is defined as data useful for
deciaion. {Goldberg, ,1965] This paper is concerned strictly with finan-
cial accounting data, hereafter FAD, as an economic good with regard to
which there are conflicts of interest that can be illuminated by a
property rights perspective.

~o~
ON PROPERTY RIGHTS
Two traditions in Anglo-American jurisprudence provide alternative
grounds for considering property rights. Common law looked on property
gs a thing owned by a person. Courts in equity looked on property as
behavior claimed of other persons. [Commons, 1924, p. 234] Both of these
traditions are reflected in accounting. Managers are concerned for con-
trol relations over things, that is, "property" in its original common
law sense of physical possession, the asset side of the balance sheet*
But in recent literature in law and economics, property rights are the
behavioral relations among men, formal and informal rules which specify
what an individual may and may not do with things (including FAD).
[Pejovich, 1972] In both traditions the difference between anarchy and
social order is the extent and stability of property rights specification.
{Stubbiehine, 1972] This specification involves distinctions between
what only one person may do with a scarce resource (often called "private
property"), what anyone may do (often called "common property"), and what
a government may do (often called "state property").
The term "property" is used here to emphasise behavioral relations .
The term "good" is used to emphasize the •nature of the scarce resource.
For distinguishing among kinds of goods, the degree of potential exclud-
ability is important. A thing is ceiled "private good" if all but one
ccnsisner can be excluded (as when an individual eats a cookie). A thing
is called "common good" if (1) an additional consumer does not affect
consumption by other persons (as when snother television set is turned
to some channel), and (2) no consumer can be feasibly excluded (for
example, national defense). A thing is called "public good" if (1) an

additional consumer does not affect consumption by other persons, and
(2) ^elusion of potential consumers Is feasible (for example, subscrip-
tion cable television). The expression ''public goods" and "private
goods" are often used ambiguously to include both ideas, thing and behavior,
with public including notions of both state and common.
In general, production and control of both private and public goods
may be subject to private, state, or common property specifications.
Conceptually, there may be not only private property rights Iti private
goods, but also private rights in public goods; not only state rights
in public goods, but also state rights in private goods; not only common
rights in public goods, but also common rights in private goods* While
the distinction between private and public goods may be valuable for
theory speculation, the present understanding of the nature of goods is
deficient as a tool for social policy decisions to improve production
and distribution of anything (including FAD), [Demsetz, 1969a j A more
useful distinction for studying social policy choice of accounting in-
stitution alternatives is between abundant free goods (of which there
may be none) and scarce economic goods. Economic goods (including FAD)
may be further classified according to the. relative benefit/cost rela-
tions of production under alternative property rights; private property
markets, state government control, and anarchy, which is the absence of
feasibly enforceable property rights* [Demsetz, 1964]
The social phenomena of property rights assignment is a necessary
and practical solution to the problem of coordinating economic activity
so as to realize and stabilize benefits from interaction. Any change
in property rights assignments will effect both an instantaneous wealth
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transfer and also, especially where transactions are- not costless, a
change in the use of economic resources, [Demsetz, 1972] Thus the con-
troversy over accounting institution alternatives is a controversy over
property rights in FAD. [See, for example, Watts and Zimmerman, 1978]
A private enterprise, free market system can operate if and only if
private property rights are assigned with regard to behavior involving
the scarce good. The advantages of a free market include diversity
s
adaptiveness, low-cost production of valuation data (as a joint effect
of exchanging goods), equity, and individual freedom. "In fact, a fun-
damental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty
and the personal right in property. Neither could have meaning without
the other." [Pennock e.nd Chapman, 1S77. p, 35, quoting Justice Potter
Stewart in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538,552, See also
Director, 1964; and Moore, 1969 e 3
These advantages of the free market should cause us skeptically to
examine assertions (such as that of Demski and Feltham, 1976. p. 214)
that "market failure" has been "documented in principle". "Whether the
alleged fortas of "market failure" really exist ie
s of course, an empirical
issue about which there is little reliable evidence." [Gonedes, Dopuch
and Penman, 1976, p. 106] But further, illusions of "market failure in
principle" rest upon strict analytic concern for end-state equilibria
with limiting assumptions such as independent utility functions, a com-
plete pattern of property rights assignment, and a set of equilibrium
prices for all goods. Concern instead for the behavioral process of
free market adjustment with interdependent utilities^ incomplete property
rights assignments, and the absence of market prices for some goods casts

doubt upon claims of market failure, whether attributed to fraud, moral
ha sard, bluffing, punishing, freer id ing or adverse selection. Such
"pathologies" are more basically analyzable as either (A) correct
rational behavior where (1) private transaction costs are in excess of
private benefits, or (2) where social policing costs are in excess of
social benefits; or (3) institutional failures preventing the smooth func-
tioning of the market by (3) the absence of specific property rights
assignment or (4) prohibitions against free exchange. None of these
should be called market; failure. But even if these cases were to be
appropriately termed market failure, "If markets be ends as well as
means, their non-efficiency is hardly sufficient grounds for rejection."
[Bator, 1958, p. 378] In a free society, markets can be considered ends
as well as means,
The legal system functions to maintain clarity of rights on the basis
of which voluntary negotiated exchange can take place * Full ownership
(that is, complete property right? to behavior) would include rights to
possess (e.g,, to use. manage, lend, destroy ? abandon, etc.); the rights
to income (e.g. ? profits, rant* fruit, etc.); the rights to security
(e.g», from theft and expropriation without due process and just compen~
sation); and the rights to transfer (e.g., to sell, give, will, etc),
(Honors, 1961] These different behavioral rights to some good may be
exercised by different o^wners, each restricted to the behavior appropriate
to hie particular private or social contract. Private ownership is never
absolute, and constraints on private property rights affect the market
value of resources* Indeed, market value is not a characteristic of
goods, but rather a property rights relation*

The corollary to property rights, or ownership behavior privileges,
is the coratttensurate duty or liability of nor.-ovners, including governments
as provided in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. For example > if
property rights to indulge in the side-effect of air pollution were given
to smokers, then non-smokt?rs would have the liability not to interfere.
Conversely, if property rights to impose clean breathing were assigned to
non-smokers „ then smokers would have the liability to refrain. Owners
of property rights will enforce liabilities only when the remedy benefits
are greater than private enforcement costs. [Bator, 1958; Demsetz, 1S64;
Arrow, 1977]
Subsequent to, and integrated with the problem of assigning property
rights, is the problem of discovering which liability rule would be more
efficiently subject to adjustment through costly market transactions if
an "error" is made in the original assignment. [Calabresi, 1968] Only
voluntary market exchange can incorporate Individual utility weighting
to improve property assignments. In sequence, custom or statutory law
assigns property rights to avoid anarchy; then to avoid permanent error,
the possibility for free- market voluntary negotiated transactions is re-
quired for optimal! ty. As a corrective device, if smokers were to have
pollution rights, then non-smokers should be free to buy abstinence from
them; or if non-smokers were to have clean air rights, then smokers should
be free to buy indulgence from them. But which alternative would have
lower negotiating, transacting and policing costs? With regard to ac-
counting, would it be more efficient for corporate insiders to have pri-
vate property rights in FAD with outsiders buying disclosure? Or for
outsiders to have common property rights in FAD with insiders buying
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secrecy? Or for no clear property rights to be maintained under lav con-
cerning the production and distribution of FAD?
Private property rights assignment enables internalization of ex-
ternality, or side-effect, problems for free market resolution. Local
markets do develop where the expected benefits are greater than trans-
action and policing costs. The "Coase Theorem" corrected a bsic error
in 1'igovian welfare economics by shoving that where transaction costs
are zero and private competitive markets exist, then the allocation of
production resources is not affected by different (reciprocal) liability
rules. Kox*ever, where transaction costs are not zero, the property
rights alternative (e.g«* to clean air breathing or smoking, and to FAD
secrecy or disclosure) will have allocstive effects leading to different
optimality equilibria. [Crocker, 1971] Analytically, there is no way
to tell the difference between a primary product, a secondary product^
and a side-effect. The distinction is empirical and pragmatic, not
analytic. All production is joint, with many physical, pecuniary, and
psychological consequences. Accountants allocate coses just to the
products that are traded in a market (or perhaps controlled by govern-
ment). This arbitrary allocation is often made according to ratio of
expected revenues. The result is zero costs assigned to products (such
as air pollution and FAB) not sold in a market*
The costs of having a market for some product may be greater than
the benefits. Then either (1) special government regulations might attain
benefits greater than total costs (including costs of discussing, admin-
istering, monitoring, litigating, enforcing, punishing, etc*); or
(2) neither market nor government arrangements can be made whereby total
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coets are lees than total benefits from ordering the behavior relations.
Contrary to a common bias, this second case would be Parete-optimal, with
the good~~such as FAD—remaining in anarchy by voluntary concensus rather
than being ordered explicitly by the imposition of either a subsidized
market or a coercive state. [Detasetz, 1964} ''There are also enormous
external costs to the citisenry associated with* . .[state political con-
trol 3 •» which, like a. few private market externalities, may be impossible
to internalize." [Manne, 1974
, p. 32]
A classic example of sice-effects involves the production of apples
and honey by separate entrepreneurs. This example illustrates the ir-
relevance of ideal alterant! ves [Meade, 1952; Bator, 1958] for considering
the real alternatives of whether there can be or should be explicit,
separate markets not only for consumption goods (apples and honey) but
al30 for side-effect producer goods (nectar and pollen transportation).
Other social side effects, such as bee stings and blossom aroma have not
been explicitly studied in this context. It may be "too costly" to
establish either market or government control over the pollinating and
nectar gathering activities of the bees* Obviously , conglomerate merger
would eliminate the side-effect problem. Also obviously, the issue is sym-
metrical and not subject to equity resolution. Less obviously, the con-
cepts of external economies and diseconomies are irrelevant because one
side of the "exchange" is a mirror image of the other* Since both apple
and honey growers are both victims (i.e., the apple grower is not paid
for his nectar, and the honey grower is not paid for transporting pollen)
and culprits (i.e., the honey grower is a thief of nectar and the apple
grower is a thief of transportation) there is no a priori ethical solution.

Anarchy (that is, no explicit voluntary market exchange) may prevail
with first come, first serve. Alternatively, there is ample evidence
that where expected private benefits exceed the transacting and policing
costs of having a market, contracts do efficiently emerge both for apple
growers buying pollination service, and for honey growers buying nectar.
[Cheung, 1973] Thus it would be inefficient for government through tax
and subsidy arrangements to (try to) impose order where (1) free markets
can function, or (2) where the benefits of anarchy exceed the costs*
Private contracts do not emerge (or if they emerge, do not persist) where
total benefits of having a market are less than the costs of having a
market. Similarly government control of any side-effect including FAD
should not emerge if total costs of having government control are greater
than total benefits from control. [Demsets, 1969] Consider the hope-
lessly ideal assertion, "If the nectar in apple blossoms is scarce and
carries a positive shadow nrice, it must be possible to make [emphasis
added] every beekeeper pay for his charges meals" [Meade* 1952, as cited
by Bator j 1958, p. 355] « Interpreted as an argument for regulation and
control, this implies an assumption of zero direct costs for accounting
records, transactions, and enforcement; and even sere opportunity costs
of eliminating private property.
Just as the existence of a market price for some good does not in
itself indicate either equitable endowment of property rights, or optimal
resource allocation, "A price for every produced good or service is not
a necessary condition for efficiency, so that the absence of a price [for
some good, such as FAD] does not Imply that either market transactions or
substitute government services are desirable*" [Demsetz, 1964, p» 14}
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Tbe usual methods for dealing with side-effects (in addition to volun-
tary transactions in a market redistribution of wealth) include (1) out-
right prohibition, (2) political regulation (time, place, amount, price,
etc*), (3) tax and subsidy redistribution by government, and (4) preventive
devices* [Mishan, 1971] But these alternatives all involve some version
of political voting with major! tarian decisions that ignore the intensity
of minority preferences*
Free markets are often spuriously criticised by comparison with some
assumed costless end-state ideal structure. The proper comparison for
imperfect mankind is not between imaginary static conditions of heaven or
hell; but rather between real, non-stationary earthy alternatives where
private property and voluntary exchange take place under many uncertain-
ties and miscalculations, and where the negative side-effects of govern-
ment action affected by similar uncertainties and miscalculations may be
far greater than external diseconomies of private markets.
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OH ACCOUNTING DATA
The accounting profession faces both definitional issues and policy
problems with regard to assignment of property rights in FAD. The concern
in this paper is strictly with the monetary accounting record of fins
performance and position, and not at all with the inforaa tiona 1 content
(such as positive or negative forecasts or technological discoveries as
discussed by Bassets (1969b), Birshleifer (1971) or Kenan (1977)*)
FAD could be considered an abundant free resource only under two
strict assumptions* (1) all joint costs of producing knowledge along
with real output are analytically associated with marketable goods;
and (2) no incremental costs are incurred to process,, complete* and dis-
tribute the finished reports. Since these assumptions do not hold real-
istically
s
FAD is not an abundant free good, It must be considered a
scarce economic good whose production cost is indeterminate
.
One definitional issue is whether FAD, pragmatically a side-effect
of other production* possesses the characteristic nature of a private
good or of a public good, But it is impossible to identify the nature
of FAD as strictly prt^te or strictly public, if FAD were in nature a
public good, then voluntary cr mandatory disclosure to one acre user
would not affect useage by other consumers. But clearly, the last in-
vestor to learn sense FAD will find his use of it impaired (if FAD is
useful for investor decisions and if the stock market is efficient) be-
cause stock price changes will have already fully reflected the revised
expectations of earlier investors who learned the data first and acted
on it as either inside traders or fortunate outsiders* Alternatively,
if FAD were in nature a private good, exclusion would be feasible and
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owners would enjoy the. benefits of secrecy- But exclusive benefit is
in fact tenuous.
As noted above, the private/ public good dichotomy cannot provide
guidance for social policy decisions as to efficiency or equity. The
nature of FAD does not guide the accounting profession or the government
in the determination of either standards or institutions. FAD is a
scarce economic good conceptually subject to three general arrangements:
private property and free market exchange* state or common property and
government control, or anarchy. An essential issue- is thisi "What are
the total benefits and costs under each institutional arrangement?" We
have virtually no empirical research to help answer this question, nor
is it clear how empirical research on this issue should proceed.
The policy problems for the accounting profession include (1) whether
individual persons, private associations, the state t or everyone in,
common should be assigned property rights in access to Che (joint produc-
tive) source of FAD; (2) whether private or governmental entities should
bear the cost and have control over the distribution of FAD; and (3)
whether the producer or everyone in common should have property rights
in FAD after production. These policy problems need not necessarily
be resolved by explicit governmental decision. Conventional justification
and evolution of customary expectations might be less disruptive and
more efficient than either legislative, executive or judicial decision.
'The social role of private property (including the right to privacy,
which is the right to keep data from becoming common knowledge) is to
prevent the excessive use of scarce resources by providing incentive for
economizing, [Knight, 1924, p. 586] Common property rights do not

provide such Incentives. Rather, goods subject to common rights will
tend to be used excessively. But what empirical meaning can be given
to the phrase "excessive use of common property" in the case of FAD
which, unlike common grazing ground or ocean fishing banks, is not
technically depleted by an increase in the number of "'users" even though
consumption benefits are depleted by additional users? For example* if
& television broadcast is an example of a common property, what "exces-
sive use" results from non-exclusion and zero pricing when TV signals
are not depleted in character by additional receivers? Perhaps "excessive
use" should be defined not in respect Co an altered condition of the good,
but rather in respect to the effects of overindulgence en the behavior
of users* The dire consequence of overgrazing common grassland or ovex"-
fishing common water is not just a technical matter of bare ground and
empty banks.
Rather, the social cost of "excessive use" means reduced human wel-
fare as an economic matter, and should be defined in respect to foregone
alternatives, the opportunity cost of Individuals using other non-aero
priced goods. For example, "excessive use" of free television could be
discussed in respect to the marginal utility decisions made by parents
and the consequences for children. That is, the total results of "exces-
sive use" would include the chronic effects on children viewed by network-
executives as a product delivered to their advertisers. As passive
spectators, they may see free too much violence, to the neglect of higher
priced goods. These bad effects could include reduced mental ability from
too little reading, reduced physical ability from too little, exercise,
and reduced social ability from too little family interaction. The bad
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effects of IV violence may be less in the stimulation of violent criminal
acts, and more in the behavioral conditioning of potential victims who,
out of anxiety and fear, will turn for security to the reassuring promises
of a police, state*
The effects of "excessive use" of TV broadcasts as a good subject
to common rights are not well known-—and neither are the effects of FAD
as a scarce good subject to state and common property arrangements* Does
the "excessive use*' of FAD mean resources wasted by users manipulating
the publicly available data in vain attempts to earn higher than normal
stock market returns? Does "excessive use" include the failure to
experiment, develop, and employ non-free alternatives with potentially
greater profitability?
The difference between private and common property rights in FAD
as a scarce good may be seen in the different decision behavior of in-
dividuals using FAD produced and distributed under voluntary disclosure
(implying private property) and mandatory disclosure (implying state
property).
The owner of private rights in FAD would be able through voluntary
disclosure to prevent other persons from acting in certain ways that
would infringe his property rights. Knowing is equivalent to possessing
FAD, which means that policing costs to assure exclusive use are likely
to be high. For social efficiency, private rights in FAD would require
that policing costs after publication be less than the negative effects
of illegal use thereby prevented (as with patent law protection). Real-
istically, private property rights in FAD may be exclusively exercised
only if there is a low cost way of keening knowledge secret (as with
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closely guarded trade secrets). But it would not be in the best interest
of corporations to keep all FAD secret* Owners of this joint-cost good
(for which there may be no explicit market) may realize benefits from
disclosure as a form of advertising. The joint benefit of a zero price
for FAD may be greater than the transacting and policing costs associated
with separate revenue from FAD market exchange. Certainly the aggregate
search costs by individual investors are reduced by corporate publication,
and. this could have a favorable effect on the demand for stock shares.
Do firm managers and auditors regard investors as a product delivered
to their corporate clients?
To argue for (or against) a change in disclosure "requirements" is
to argue for (or against) a change in property rights. As noted above,
abrupt changes in legal rules of endowment effect wealth transfers by
altering expectations, and lead to different equilibria where transaction
costs and policing costs are not zero. At the Constitutional level, this
accounting policy problem is part of a broader social issue, namely the
private property right; to privacy (i.e., voluntary disclosure of information)
[Gross, 1971] versus the common property right of the public, to know, or
the state property right of the government to know (i*e., mandato ry dis-
closure). At th<d. Constitutional level, this issue requires an explicit
examination of the criteria for social change; Why would any realignment
of property rights be worthwhile? From an efficiency point of view, what
are the characteristic behaviors of alternative equilibria where imper-
fect knowledge, indivisible products, transactions costs, interdependent
utilities, heterogeneous tastes and incomplete markets affect both busi-
ness competition and government control?
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OK PARETO-OPTjKALITy
Pareto-optimali ty is at best a static concept, implying sorae com-
plete set of individual endowments (property rights) given by social
institutions and modified by strictly voluntary exchange in a free market
structure of equilibrium prices. Pareto-optiraali ty does not indicate
that any normative criterion other than conditional efficiency has been
satisfied, [Bator, 1958; Sen, 1970} Pareto-optimali ty can be. defined
as any situation from which any move would make at least one Individual
worse off, where "worse off" is defined as a position that would be
voluntar ily rejected. Thus a social change would be desirable only if no
one would become worse off and at least one individual better off* where
"better off" is defined as a position that would be voluntarily chosen.
Pareto-optimali ty loses its significance when voluntarism is elim-
inated from exchange and production and some presumptive social welfare
function is imposed to constrain some individual preferences in order to
"make" someone better off. [Buchanan, 1959. p. 125] There is a differ-
ence between arguing that a social welfare function does not exist and
arguing that it cannot be determined or constructed under our present state
of knowledge. Either way, a presumptive welfare function is likely to be
"wrong" in some significant way which can't be known apart from expressed
individual choice* Even if we had a social welfare function, it would
require some ground for Individual utility comparison--the very obstacle
that Pareto sought to overcome by his definition of an optimal! ty position.
Voluntary unanimity is the only assurance that a change from some social
position is toward a Pa re to-optimal equilibrium. Pareto developed the
concept of optima lity for only exchange and production, but not for

p. 366-367, emphasis added]* "Best" may be defined with regard to
criteria concerned with either the original endowments structure among
persons and groups, the exchange process, or the outcome. Any dissatis-
faction with the outcome pattern of wealth distribution can be viewed
as dissatisfaction with either the original property rights assignment
or the exchange process* Given an endowment that is "equitable" (whatever
that may be), voluntary exchange will assure not only equity in distribu-
tion hut also maximum efficiency in production. Or given an endowment
that is "unequi table 4 * (whatever that may he) , government control over
exchange might be able to secure someone* s notion of equity in distribu-
tion but only at the (perhaps very high) cost of reduced production.
The social policy choice between (1) reassigning property rights in
FAD, (2) controlling disclosure, or (3) directly redistributing outcome
(for example through a negative income tax tied directly to personal in-
come from stock ownership) cannot be made on the grounds of Pareto-
optimality analysis which (A) takes as given some property rights con-
figuration and voluntary exchange* and (8) accepts the outcome as both
equitable and efficient* Knowing the actual operating characteristics
of real alternative arrangements is necessary for making institutional
choice a rational process,, (DemsetZj 1969]
While empirical research into types of FAD and methods of dissemi-
nation is necessary j such research into data and disclosure is not suf-
ficient for rational choice among alternative social policies concerning
private property rights in PAD* Regardless of whether FAD is generally
considered in nature a private or public good, the property rights issue,

distritmtion which he assumed determinable only through reference to
considerations other than, economic ones [Pareto, 1971, p. 267], For
Pareto, only private interest is real; public interest is imaginary
S*pp. 75-76], in part because one man's taste is another man's obstacle
[p, no}.
If a contemplated change were endorsed by everyone, then assuming
the accuracy of expressed individual preferences, the change would in-
crease efficiency as the free market mechanism allocates resources to
attain maximum individual utility. Without revealed preferences, social
scientists c&n never say that one social situation is store efficient for
attaining utility than, any other (even though it is common for many social
scientists and administrators to act as if they presume omniscience and
impose their private preferences as constraints on other persons)*
Naturally, this general statement applies fully to choice among alterna-
tive FAD standards and institutions—-a policy choice which is substan-
tially a choice among alternative assignments of property rights*
"The preoccupation of traditions! welfare theory with static optimi-
sation problems and the abstract conditions for [hypothetical] Pareto-
optimality has tended to divert attention frcrri [real] institutional con-
siderations." [Furubotn and Pejovich, p. 172}
The choice of FAD property rights should be made with the "realizatiot
that institutional choice involves the comparison of alternative arrange-
ments which are necessarily non-optimal in the [voluntary] sense of
Pareto.1. The problem is to choose from a feasible set of institutional
arrangements that particular one which gives the most suitable or "best"
allocation of that good under consideration." (David &x\6 Whinston,
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the sanctioning of behavioral relations, is more fundamental. It should
be addressed separately as of paramount importance.
Because it is not necessarily ideal in principle to require explicit
market exchange or government control for ail goods, the empirical issue
involves a comparison of the total effects of different institutional
arrangements for dealing with FAD side-effects and indivisabiiities.
It is not sufficient in a policy debate to show only that the ex-
pectation of ideal government control has some benefit, or even that
actual anarchy has some costs* The full comparison should be made be-
tween the total effects of different arrangements* with (2) the under-
standing that state and common property, no less than private property*
siay lead to external diseconomies; and with (2) the presumption that
advocates and opponents speak for the alternative that is in their own
self interest. [Watts and Ziasaerman ? 1973; Benston, 1969j Manney, 1966,
1969* and 1974] The burden of proof should be placed unequivocally upon
those who advocate any form of coercive control of FAD by the elimination
of private property rights.
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SUMMARY PROPQSTXONS
State laws give de facto ownership of corporations to the managers
by legal devices such as limited control, limited access to data, limited
liability, and lisaited participation in profit for the investor. [Winter,
1977] Corporate managers have most of the usual behavior prerogatives of
ownership (rights to use, manage, lend, abandon, destroy, etc.; and rights
to security) » Investors really "own" nothing more than their equity
shares (rights to transfer, contingent rights to income, and rights to
vote). This separation between investors and managers creates the basis
for an efficient inequality of information between corporate insiders
and outside investors. This FAD inequality gives rise to independent
auditing of fiduciary reports.
Alternatives, such as "guarantees, warranties, and other forms of
insurance that protect, for a fee, a capital market agent against losses
from distorted information, which can be viewed as being analogous to
a defective product" [Gonedes, Sopuch and Penman. 1976, p, 102] were not
prohibited by law, But the fact that they did not arise as a free market
response to the problem of FAD authentication should be taken as some
evidence that voluntary auditing is the store efficient solution, with
the role of the auditor restricted to attesting that management did what
it claimed In FAD to have done. There are grounds for thinking [Bens ton,
1969a, 1969b, 1973] that mandatory disclosure, with auditors (private or
state) controlin% what management may choose to do in FAD, is in fact
net socially efficient.
"A straight forward criminal enforcement program against fraud may
have been more appropriate and less costly than has the so-called
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disclosure approach/' [Manne, 1974, p, 26] and store in keeping with our
private property traditions*
Institutions and standards associated with FAD nave become the
center of a four-way conflict of interest over property rights; managers,
investors, auditors end government regulators* Since the nature of FAD
(as private or public good) cannot provide the necessary insight for
theory or policy, the reminder of this paper seeks to derive from the
perspective of property rights certain propositions relating to:
(1) FAD users, (2) valuation, (3) measurement, (4) FAD changes, (5) wel-
fare, and (6) efficiency; and two hypotheses about the effects of any
accounting institution having power to mandate FABs,
Each corporation has a natural lowest cost monopoly over the pro-
duction of its own unique FAD, The absence of viable competition in the
production of firm specific FAD is the reason for independent auditing
to authenticate reports* Hie de_ facto ownership of FAD by corporate
managers is consistent with (1) the labor theory of entitlement (Locke*
1690]; (2) recent court decisions that records are the private property
of record keepers [Llnowee, 1977, p. 7,. citing United States v. Miller
425 U.S. 435 (1976)}, and (3) the AICPA position that accounting reports
are the responsibility of their clients, corporate managers. If it is
true that owners of a good generally are its major users because they
have the property rights, then,*.
1 . Corporate managers, rather than outsiders like
investors, creditors, and regulators, are the
major users of FAD for both internal and ex-
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Even though FAD is a scarce good, and even though it were seen as
potentially useful by both insiders and outsiders, it is not valued on
the balance sheet because it does not meet the criteria of "generally
accepted accounting principles" for assets, namely: (1) FAB is internally
generated, (2) it has zero allocated joint production cost, and (3) it
has no market price. But there is no analytical ground for distinguish-
ing between products and side-effects, and therefore no analytical ground
for either excluding or including in FAD any non-marketable goods. If
there can be no non-arbitrary basis for recognizing and valuing non-raarket
goods (including FAB), then...
2. Pragmatic emphasis on verifiable, objective
market transactions as the basis for both
recognition and valuation in FAD is sound .
If this is true, then assertions of "present values" and "social indi-
cators" as part of FAB should be viewed with grave skepticism.
No attribution of monetary value can represent an inherent character-
istic of either (1) separately disposable assets, (2) separately ex-
tinguishable equity claims, or (3) or the organization as a separate
entity. Monetary magnitudes are at best dated market relations in which
owners voluntarily contract for the exchange of some property right (s)
where money reduces private transaction costs below what would prevail
in a barter economy. Incorrigible allocations over time periods and
products make accounting numbers an index of market relations—not a
measure of things . These allocations are justifiable not at all by
a priori criteria, but only be reference to pragmatic criteria. If all
production is joint, if monetary costs are allocated over only a (perhaps
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email) marketable subset of the identifiable products (physical, pecuniary,
and physic) , and if value relates to property rights rather than to the
nature of goods, then. -
.
3, Accounting cannot comply with the requirements
of measurement theory (such as extensivity and
additivity) and so cannot be a measurement
science.
Before mandating any non-compensated (Michelman, 196S) wealth re-
distribution in the form of reassigned property rights, the rational
dictator (no matter how selected or how benevolent) would demand research
into the (most likely) effects from revising endowments and constraining
voluntary market readjustments. "Clearly the SSC T s favorite argument:
without mandatory disclosure the public would lose confidence in the
securities markets and refuse to invest in American industry. .rests on
the totally unverified and even illogical notion that fraud and decep-
tion, not financial lossses, drove the public out of the market after
October 1929.*. The SEC*s confidence argument has some of the character-
istics of a confidence game." [Hanne, 1974, p. 64] If FAD affects stock
prices, and if the stock market is efficient in a Pareto-optimal sense,
then. ,
.
.4, Any change in the published FAB system will.
make someone worse off .
For a rational choice of social policy change, we need to know pre-
cisely who will be harmed by changing the property rights in FAB; who
(if any) will be helped, in what way, and by how much.
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If the stock market is efficient, then FAD is economically worth-
less as common property for trading purposes. Since generally accepted
accounting principles are based on historical costs, FAD may have little
worth as private property for decisions that depend upon forecasts and
future implementation. Whether FAD (as private or common property) is
useful for production (as private or public good), if FAD is not a
consumption good, then..,
5. Reassigning property rights in FAB as a means
of welfare redistribution is at best an in-
efficient way to r educe Inequality of consump-
tion between the "rich" and the "poor" .
If that is true, then equity arguments by the SEC and FASB that tend to
support mandatory disclosure rules on the grounds of welfare transfer
are misplaced. The "equal access" argument overlooks (1) the fact that
reducing ignorance is costly, and (2) the probability that information
inequality is socially efficient.
The fact that private property rights do have social consequences
is not sufficient reason for advocating either common property rights
in FAD or state property regulation of FAD production and distribution.
If private property rights in FAD were not violated, then the choice
among accounting alternatives would be strictly private (subject, of
course, to tort and criminal laws governing fraud, deception, etc).
This pluralism in the market place for financial ideas about accounting
data would maintain the necessary conditions and incentives for experi-
menting with various monetary indices. This would foster a healthy
skepticism about the "useful meaning" of accounting numbers. Each
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corporation would be free to perform its own cost/benefit analysis of
accounting alternatives with effective emphasis on economizing scarce
resources. But if subjected to ideological determination by hard core
metaphysical "beliefs" of accountants, then..*
6. State or common property rights in financial
accounting data with^ mandatory disclosure and
uniform standards will be wasteful ly inefficient
and ineffective,
If these six propositions are accurate, then it is likely that
relevant empirical research to permit total benefit/cost comparisons
among alternative actual institutional arrangements for financial
accounting data would confirm the following hypotheses* Non-voluntary
incre-ases in accounting disclosures, whether imposed directly by SEC
or indirectly through FASB-AICPA, will effect this i! Ifare tradeoff:
7a « The mandatory increase in demand for strictly
moni toring s ervice s will make accountants and
regulator s better off .
7b. The increased direct costs* both private and
public ? and the production opportunities
foregone by resource reallocation, will make
corporate managers , investors, and the public
at large worse off.
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CONCLUSION
The nature of FAD as private or public good has not provided the
necessary insight for developing accounting theory to resolve the
crisis of accounting standards and institutions. Property rights,
defined as sanctioned social and economic behavior relations among per-
sons specifying what individuals may do with things, emphasizes the
difference between private and state or common property rights* Recent
developments of property rights literature in law and economics suggest
that ideological unformation is likely (1) to expand FABLES about the
merit of common property, and (2) to eliminate private FADS* The result
will be uncentive effects of an ilifare state. If a free market economy
is to survive, the full burden of empirical proof must be placed squarely
on those who advocate reducing private property rights and constraining
voluntary decisions. Thus far this burden has not been carried by
the SEC/FASB/AICPA power proponents. Has our ideology shifted so far
from freedom to control that proof is not required?
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